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Abstract
The organizational design of research and development conditions the incentives of the
researchers of the research project. In particular, the organizational form determines the
allocation of effort of the researcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying
management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However, the researchers only
get utility from performing research if the project is approved for its full duration. Spending time
lobbying management for the continuation of the researcher’s project increases the probability
that the management observes a favorable signal about the project. Organizing a research joint
venture increases the flexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuation
decision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners about the expected profitability
of the project, we find that the organization of a research joint venture reduces influence activity
by the researchers and increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlation between the
signals, internal research projects lower influence activity by the researchers. We try to relate the
correlation of the partners signals to the characteristics of basic research versus more applied
research projects, and find that the model is consistent with the observation that research joint
ventures seem involved in more basic research projects compared to internal R&D departments,
which concentrate on more applied research.
Keywords: Research joint ventures; Influence activity; Signal jamming; Incomplete contracts
JEL classification: D82, L13, L50, O383
Introduction
In the literature the term research and development covers a wide range of activities from basic or
fundamental research all the way to the actual development of a product or process to market
strength (Nason (1981)). In economic modeling the type of research that is performed is never
explicitly taken into account. However, the characteristics of the research project can be crucial in
explaining the occurrence of different organizational forms with respect to research and
development, in particular whether a firm decides to cooperate in research and development or
prefers to develop a project as an internal R&D project. This paper analyzes the relation between
the organizational structure of research and development, its effect on the researchers’ incentives,
and the characteristics of the research project that is performed.
The objective of the firm is to choose the organizational structure to maximize the
expected profits of the research project. Typically, the research project involves several stages.
After each stage, the results and progress of the research project are evaluated. At each of these
stages, management has to decide whether the project still corresponds to the strategic objectives
of the firm, and if so, the project is continued and new funds are allocated. The researchers
usually care strongly about their research project and its continuation. This leads the researchers
to try to influence this decision by the management in favor of continuing the project, regardless
of the value of the project to the firm. These influence activities or organizational politics have
been documented to be important activities within an organization (see Schilit and Locke (1982),
Howell and Higgins (1990), Prasad and Rubenstein (1992), Gresov and Stephens (1993)). The
time that researchers spend lobbying management, is time that the researchers do not devote to
productive activities. Hence, the optimal organizational design needs to take into account its
effect on the reseachers’ incentives to engage in influence activity, given that influence activity
affects the expected profitability of the project (Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1991)).4
In order to analyze this relation between organizational structure, researchers’ incentives
to engage in influence activity, and the project characteristics, we develop a stylized model of a
research joint venture and an internal research project. In this model an individual firm is
indifferent between organizing a research joint venture and setting up an internal research project
when the researcher wastes no effort in lobbying management. We concentrate on one important
reason for firms to set up research joint ventures: flexibility (Kogut (1991)), and abstract from the
cost sharing aspect of joint ventures, because it clouds the other issues: obviously, all else equal
(assuming that benefits stay the same) a joint venture where firms split costs is more attractive
than an internal R&D project where one firm bears all the costs. The fact that joint ventures
increase flexibility and the effect this increased flexibility has on the internal workings of the
joint venture is less clear. We suggest that increased flexibility affects the allocation of the
researcher’s effort between productive and unproductive activities. In the literature the greater
flexibility of joint ventures has often been mistaken for instability of joint ventures (Gomes-
Casseres (1987)). Our joint venture model is more in line with Kogut (1991), where he describes
the joint venture as a “real” option to expand. The timing of this expansion, which is associated
with the acquisition of the joint venture by one of the partners, is related to a signal about the
value of the venture. In our model, the firms receive a signal about the expected profitability of
the project for their firm. The project can either be highly profitable for the firm (high signal) or
worthless (low signal). These signals are assumed to be observable but not verifiable. The project
is assumed to be profitable whenever at least one firm gets a high signal. The flexibility of the
joint venture is related to the fact that the project can be profitable for one firm and not for the
other. In this case, the project should be continued by the firm for which the project is expected to
be profitable. This results in a higher flexibility of the joint venture with respect to the
continuation decision compared to an internal R&D project.5
The results of the model are driven by the following observation: the only option for the
internal R&D project after a low signal is to liquidate the project, while in the research joint
venture, there is the option to renegotiate control over the project. In the internal R&D project,
there is no partner to observe a signal about the profitability of the project. Other firms are unable
to value this project. This is consistent with the results of Gomeres-Casseres (1987) who finds
that subsidiaries of multinational firms are more likely to liquidate compared to joint ventures.
Joint ventures are more likely subject to renegotiation of control and ownership structures
(Blodgett (1992)). The flexibility of the research joint venture and the allocation of control over
the research project are thus interrelated. Renegotiation of control over the research project takes
place in the research joint venture whenever the partner in control gets a low signal, while the
other partner observes a high signal. Ownership and control are positively correlated but not
necessarily perfectly (Geringer and Herbert (1989)). Ownership conveys the following residual
rights (in the sense of Grossman and Hart (1986)) to the party not in control:
- veto right in important operating decisions,
- right of first refusal to buy out the other partner.
2
Ownership thus creates an option on the future (Kogut (1983)), or, more appropriately in this
model, an option on control over the research project. In an internal R&D project, on the other
hand, ownership and control coincide and can not be separated. Ex post the research joint
venture, thus, provides the instruments to separate ownership and control, a fact that we associate
with the flexibility of the research joint venture. In that respect, this paper is related to Zender
(1991) and Aghion and Bolton (1992). These authors view debt as an optimal mechanism for the
contingent allocation of control. In our model, the research joint venture serves a similar purpose
for the contingent allocation of control over a research project.
                    
     
2 Usually, one partner will set the price of shares and the other has the option to buy that
partner's shares or sell his own shares to the partner for that price.6
As stated before, we have set up the model such that if there is no influence activity by
the researchers, the firm is indifferent between organizing an internal R&D project or a research
joint venture. This implies that any preference over whether to organize a research joint venture
or an internal R&D project, is solely due to the existence of influence activity on the part of the
researchers. Our main result in the paper states that whether or not the researcher spends more
time influencing the continuation decision in the internal R&D project compared to the research
joint venture, depends on the correlation between the signals of the potential partners. If the
signals of potential partners are highly correlated, the researcher in the research joint venture
spends more time influencing the continuation decision, because she can only guarantee
continuation if both signals are high. This requires more lobbying effort. If the signals are not
highly correlated, the researcher can assure continuation in the research joint venture whenever
one of the signals is high. In the internal R&D project, the project is continued whenever the firm
observes the high signal. Note that the firm in the internal R&D project cannot condition the
continuation policy on the signal of the potential partner. That signal is not observable, given that
the other firm did not commit to the partnership. The choice of the organizational design thus
implies a choice over information structures. The information set in the internal R&D project is
coarser than in the research joint venture. If the correlation is low, the finer information structure
in the research joint venture lowers the influence activities of the researcher compared to the
internal R&D project. If correlation is high, this result is reversed, where the coarser information
structure of the internal R&D project reduces influence activity compared to the finer information
structure of the research joint venture. Cremer (1995) finds a similar result, where the principal
needs to decide on his monitoring technology. In his model a better monitoring technology can
hurt the principal, because it increases the cost of commitment not to renegotiate with the agent.
Note that in the absence of influence activities, the firm is indifferent about the information
structure.7
A natural second question is which organizational structure dominates in terms of
expected profits: the research joint venture or the internal R&D project. Again, the answer
depends on the correlation between the signals of the partners in the research joint venture. If the
correlation between the signals is low, we find that the research joint venture always dominates
the internal R&D project. However, when correlation is high, the results are ambiguous. We
show that there exist cases where the internal R&D project dominates the research joint venture.
This result is interesting, because in the research joint venture, the firms have better information
to make a continuation decision. However, having better information can hurt the firm. In that
case, the internal R&D project, where the firm limits its information set, dominates the research
joint venture. In an example, we show that for high levels of correlation, it is possible that the
research joint venture dominates the internal R&D project.
Next, we try to relate the model and its results to the statement that research joint
ventures tend to perform more basic research projects compared to internal R&D projects. This
statement is not uncommon in the popular literature on research and development. In their study
of the VLSI project, Collins and Doorley (1990) find that “there was a clear split between
fundamental research carried out within the joint laboratories and more applied work undertaken
with the companies themselves.” One of the explanations for this observation is the fact that basic
research is thought to be less appropriable than development. As a result, firms form research
joint ventures in order to internalize this externality while concentrating internal R&D efforts on
the more appropriable results of applied research. Although the appropriability argument seems
to explain this observation, it does not account for the organizational design of the research joint
venture. In order to solve this externality, firms need to be able to contract on the inputs and
share in the costs of the project to realize it. The model in this paper does not rely on the sharing
of costs.8
In order to relate the organizational design of research and development to the nature of
the research project, we pinpoint two characteristics of more basic research projects. First, the
benefits of basic research projects are less likely to be correlated between the partners in the
research project, because these projects are more likely to come up with unexpected results.
Secondly, the results of more basic research projects still need to be incorporated into new
products and processes. As a result, we expect that the eventual benefits from basic research
projects are less likely to be competitive between partners. The results of the model indicate that
if the correlation between the signals of the partners is low, and if future profits are not likely to
be competitive, the organization of a research joint venture dominates organizing the project
internally. Given the characteristics of more basic research projects, we thus find that these
projects are more likely to be organized in a research joint venture. Organizing a more basic
research project internally, creates more influence activity than when organized in a research
joint venture.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we develop the
model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium of the model and analyzes the results of the model. We
illustrate the results of the model by way of an example in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in
Section 5 with a discussion and some possible extensions of the model.
Model
Consider two firms, firm x and firm y, that each have a single line of business. For the time being
we assume that firm x cannot or does not want to replicate firm y's line of business internally.
Firm x is considering one R&D project and can decide to do this R&D project jointly with firm y
by forming a research joint venture (RJV) or firm x can do the project internally (IRD). We
concentrate on firm x's decision and assume that the control rights over the project are allocated
to firm x at the start of the project, but can be renegotiated during the game in the research joint9
venture.
3 The firm which has control rights over the project pays all the costs of the R&D project.
This allows us to focus attention on other aspects of organizing a research joint venture than cost
sharing and ownership.
4 We will discuss the implications of these assumptions and relax them
later on. Each partner in the research project needs to sink an amount e into setting up the
project, where e is “small”. This can be considered as an initial investment for starting up the
project.
The project employs one researcher or one team of researchers. This researcher engages
in preliminary research on the project. However, knowing that the project still needs to pass a
final evaluation, the researcher devotes time both to preliminary research and lobbying activities.
The lobbying activities are intended to influence management into continuing the research
project. The researcher thus allocates her time, T, between influence activities, i, and research, t,
on the project. The actual allocation of the researcher's time is not observed by the management,
implying that the researcher cannot be rewarded for spending more time on research and less on
lobbying management. This assumption seems reasonable, given that finding appropriate
measures for evaluating research personnel in reality, is always problematic (Brown and Gobeli
(1992)).
                    
     
3  Having control rights over the project allows that party to intervene during the project and
take actions that are not contractible, but increase the value of the project to that firm. The only
rights that ownership conveys on the party that does not have control is a veto right to certain
actions and certain rights when the partnership is dissolved. We will not explicitly model any
decision over these non-contractible actions, but we assume that each firm weakly prefers to have
control over the project. See Aghion and Bolton (1992) for an explicit model.
     
4 We assume that firm x cannot sell the right to join the RJV to firm y to extract the value of
the RJV to firm y and create any intrinsic value of the RJV over the IRD. Alternatively we could
assume that the expected NPV of the project to firm y (and firm x under symmetry) is zero.
Ownership in a research joint venture is often determined by the initial investment. In the model,
we concentrate on the continuation decision of the project. The initial investment is sunk at that
time.10
The decision of the management whether or not to continue the research project,
depends on the expected profitability of the project. The final evaluation of the project is based on
a signal, s, that the management receives about the expected profitability of the project for that
firm. If the project is set up as a RJV between firm x and firm y, we allow for renegotiation of the
control (and ownership) of the project between the partners after the signal is observed. In
equilibrium the signal is a perfect predictor of the researcher's allocation of time to research
effort. To avoid a simplistic contract where the researcher is rewarded based on the signal, we
assume that the signal is not verifiable by a third party. After the signals have been observed and
renegotiation has taken place, the firm that has control over the project needs to decide whether
or not to continue the project and sink another amount of capital, F, into the research project for
its actual development. Finally, the payoffs are realized.














In order to describe the payoffs, we need to put some more structure on the model. The
researcher has limited time to allocate over lobbying management for the continuation of the
project and working on the research project. If the researcher spends i time on influence activity,
then there is only T-i time left to do research. The researcher realizes private benefits from
performing research if the project is continued past the evaluation stage.
5 The rationale for this
assumption is that the researcher anticipates that once the funds are committed by the
management, the researcher can enjoy performing the actual research after having made a
                    
  
5 Because these benefits are not transferable, influence activity and the distribution of rents
become an important issue (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)).11
specific investment in this project. If the project is not continued, the researcher will need to find
a new project and go through the whole evaluation stage again, i.e. making a new specific
investment. We assume that the private benefits that accrue to the researcher from doing
research, conditional on the continuation of the project, are increasing in the amount of time
devoted to research, b(T-i). To make the model tractable, we assume that the private benefits of
the researcher are linear in the time devoted to preliminary research: b(T-i) = T-i. The
researcher spends all her available time on research or lobbying, given that she is not averse to
spending effort. However, lobbying is costly to the researcher because of the opportunity cost of
lobbying time. We assume that the researcher is employed by the firm at a fixed wage (which we
normalize to zero) and that she is not remunerated on a project by project basis. This could be due
to the fact that some tasks that the researcher performs (such as doing “research”) are hard to
measure. As a result, it is optimal to pay the researcher a flat wage (see Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991)). Alternatively we could assume that the researcher is infinitely risk averse and can not be
motivated by a monetary transfer from the firm (Aghion and Tirole (1997)).
6
The payoffs of the firms depend on their signal about the expected profitability of the
project. Firm i can get one of two signals, si, about the expected profitability of the project: a high
signal (1) or a low signal (0),  { } si ˛ 01 , . The prior marginal probability without influence
activity is P(si = 1) = ½. Organizing a research joint venture implies bringing in another firm.
The informational implication of this organization is that both firms get a signal about the
profitability of the project to their firm. We define a state of nature, k,  when organizing a IRD as
k ˛ S
IRD = {sx | sx ˛ {0, 1}} = {0, 1}, while when organizing a RJV as k ˛ S
RJV = {( sx , sy ) | sx,
                    
    
6 Given that the allocation of effort by the researcher is unobservable and given his specific
investment into the project, the researcher always has an incentive to influence the signal if not
fully compensated for the expected rents related to this investment. This compensation, however,
might introduce other distortions in the effort choice of the researcher, especially if the researcher
could also influence the signal in the negative direction.14
We assume that the profits are not contractible ex ante. Contractibility in this simple
setting would imply that the firm can infer the amount of influence activity from the realization
of the payoffs and force the optimal amount of influence activity (zero). This assumption could be
avoided by constructing a more involved model, without adding any insights to the results of the
paper. We think that it is reasonable to assume that for R&D projects, future profits are not likely
to be contractible (Aghion and Tirole (1994)).
A first result provides a useful benchmark for the rest of the analysis. This proposition
also enlightens the set up of the model, where we want to focus attention on the relation between
organizational design and influence activity by the researcher while eliminating other possible
effects in the model.
Proposition 1: If there is no influence by the researcher, i = 0, and if individual firm profits are
the same under both organizational forms, g = 1, firm x is indifferent between
organizing the project as an internal R&D project or as a research joint venture.
proof: Given the low signal, firm x gets zero profits. In that case firm x does not care whether
the project is discontinued or if control is given to firm y, since the firm in control pays
full continuation costs and the organization, by assumption, does not influence the
researcher's effort allocation.
Next we need to describe how time spent influencing the continuation decision of
management, impacts the problem. The researcher wants to avoid the discontinuation of the
project. The project is discontinued for sure if the party in control gets the low signal. Influence
activity reduces the probability that the low signal is actually observed. Hence, influence activity
increases the probability that the management observes the high signal while the true signal is
low. Assume that the probability that the firm observes a high signal, while the true state is low,
is a function of the time that the researcher spends influencing the decision, q(i).
Formally: ( ) P s s q i i i $ | ( ) = = = 1 0 where  $ s  denotes the signal that management
observes and s denotes the true signal.15
To simplify the analysis, we assume that  ( ) P s s i i $ | = = = 1 1 1. If the true signal is high,
management will always observe this. Influence activity only tries to avoid a bad evaluation of the
project. This assumption does not affect the main insights of the model. The results continue to
hold provided that influence activity increases the probability of observing the high signal relative
to when no influence is exerted.
We make the following assumptions about the influence function:
Assumption 2:
2.1 q(i) is increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable in i,
2.2 q(0) = 0, q(T) = 1 and q’(0) = ¥,
2.3 " £ £ £ ¢  0   i   T: 
1  -  q(i)
q(i)
   (T  -  i)q (i)
If there is no influence activity by the researcher, then the probability that management
observes the high signal while the true signal is low, is zero. By engaging in influence activity,
the researcher can increase the probability that management observes the high signal while the
true signal is low. As noted above, we assume that if the true signal is high, it will always be
revealed as high. Assumption 2.3 is a condition on the likelihood ratio of observing high versus
low when the true signal is low. Influence activity needs to be sufficiently successful in changing
the observed signal from the true signal when the true signal is low. In the example section, we
identify a class of functions that satisfy this assumption.
In the research joint venture we assume that influence activity works independently on
both the signals of firm x and firm y. It is then straightforward to extend the effect of influence
activity to the case of the research joint venture. The researcher concentrates on avoiding a low
signal.
If both true signals are low, the signal observed by management has the following properties:16
( ) P s s s s i w q i x y x y $ , $ | , ; , ( ) = = = = = 1 1 0 0
2
( ) ( ) ( ) P s s s s i w P s s s s i w q i q i x y x y x y x y $ , $ | , ; , $ , $ | , ; , ( ) ( ) = = = = = = = = = = - 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
( ) ( ) P s s s s i w q i x y x y $ , $ | , ; , ( ) = = = = = - 0 0 0 0 1
2
If one of the true signals is high while the other is low, the signal observed has the following
properties:
( ) ( ) P s s s s i w P s s s s i w q i x y x y x y x y $ , $ | , ; , $ , $ | , ; , ( ) = = = = = = = = = = 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
( ) ( ) P s s s s i w P s s s s i w q i x y x y x y x y $ , $ | , ; , $ , $ | , ; , ( ) = = = = = = = = = = - 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
If both true signals are high, this is always observed by management:
( ) P s s s s i w x y x y $ , $ | , ; , = = = = = 1 1 1 1 1
Given a level of influence i and correlation w, this leads to the following joint distribution of the
observed signals:
Firm y
$ sy = 0 $ sy = 1
Firm x
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Influence activity affects the marginal distribution of the observed signal in the following way:
( ) P s
q i
i $ ( )
= = - 0
1
2 2
 and  ( ) P s
q i
i $ ( )




We assume that the researcher has no private information about the true signal. This17
simplifies the analysis considerably and classifies this model as a signal jamming model
(Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)). Given that the signal reveals something about the business
opportunities of the project, it seems reasonable to assume that the researcher has no hidden
information. The only private information in the model is a hidden action by the researcher
namely the allocation of the researcher's time between influence and research activity (see also
Milgrom (1988)).
To describe the expected profits of the firms, we need to introduce some more notation.
Definition 1: Define m(k |  $ s ; i) as the beliefs of the firm that the true state of nature is k after
observing  $ s  when the researcher spends i time on influence activity where k,
$ s ˛ S
IRD when organizing the project internally or k,  $ s ˛ S
RJV when organizing
a joint venture.
Definition 2: Define l( $ s  ; i) as the probability that state  $ s  is observed when the influence
level is i, where  $ s ˛ S
IRD when organizing the project internally or  $ s ˛ S
RJV
when organizing a joint venture.
Note that l( $ sx = 1; 0) = l( $ sx = 0 ; 0) = ½ and l( $ sx = 1, $ sy = 1; 0) = l( $ sx = 0 , $ sy = 0 ; 0) = w/2.
Definition 3: A Continuation Policy is a function
d
j  : S
j ﬁ {0, 1}
where d
j (s) = 1, implies that the project is continued after signal s is observed
and where d
j(s) = 0, implies that the project is discontinued after signal s is
observed and j ˛{IRD, RJV}.
Let Px
IRD(t, i,  $ s ) be the expected profits of firm x in the IRD, given research effort t, influence
level i, and when signal  $ s is observed, conditional  on continuation of the project:25
This implies that at w*, due to Proposition 2, the firms’ policy is to continue the project for all
signals except when both firms observe a low signal.
10
As noted in Proposition 2, influence activity can cause several inefficiencies. First,
influence activity is costly to the firm because it reduces the research effort by the researcher.
Secondly, it worsens decision making because the project is continued when sometimes it is
unprofitable to do so. A third inefficiency is created when the correlation of the signals is high. In
that case, the firms observing one high and one low signal will be very suspicious about the
observation and prefer to discontinue the project, believing that in the true state both signals are
low. Influence activity thus forces the firm to change the efficient continuation decision in that
case. This is exactly when Condition (1) is violated.
The following comparative statics can be derived on the influence activity of the researcher in the
RJV:
Proposition 4: if w < w :  i
w




if w > w :  i
w




proof: Obvious comparative statics result from the first order conditions of the problem.
The intuition for this result is as follows: If w < w*, the researcher should only be
concerned if the true signal is low for both firms. The likelihood of this being the case increases
                    
     
10 There does not exist a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game. Note that given the
concavity of the researcher’s problem, the researcher has a unique pure strategy influence level,
regardless of the continuation decision by the firms. At w = w*, the firm making the continuation
decision is indifferent between continuation or not. Any mixed strategy on the part of the decision
maker would increase the amount of influence activity by the researcher because i
RJV2 > i
RJV1, "
w. This implies that if w > w*, we know that Condition (1) is violated for the RJV. Any mixed
strategy increases influence activity and thus it must be the case that Condition (1) is also violated
for any mixed strategy so that the firm cannot be indifferent.26
with the correlation and as a result, influence activity increases with correlation.
11 If w > w*, the
researcher can only obtain continuation if both firms observe high signals. As correlation
increases, the likelihood of the true signal being high for both firms increases. Increased
correlation thus reduces the optimal level of influence activity by the researcher.
3. Relating the IRD and the RJV
In this subsection we attempt to compare the outcome when the firm organizes the project as an
IRD with the case where the firm decides to perform the project with a partner in a RJV. We state
our main finding in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds,
" w £ w*: i
IRD > i
RJV
" w > w*: i
IRD < i
RJV
proof: Case w £ w*
When substituting i





3  -  2q(i )  -  q(i )   -  1
IRD IRD 2 (P1)
Note that i
IRD does not depend on w and 0 < w < w* < 1.
If 1 - 2q(i
IRD) - q(i
IRD)
2 < 0, we can show that this expression is negative.
This obviously hold for w small.




2 = 1 - q(i
IRD) - (1 - i)q'(i
IRD)q(i
IRD)
We know from Assumption 2 that this expression is negative for all i.




Case w > w*
                    
    
11 This result seems to suggest that firm x should look for a partner with a signal that is
perfectly negatively correlated (w=0). Low correlation of the signals does not imply that the firms
are necessarily distant in terms of their technology employed. We will argue that this correlation
is related to the nature of research performed, i.e basic versus applied (see below). In order to
relax this result somewhat we could introduce a probability of success for projects. Projects with
lower correlation of the signals would imply lower expected success rates.27
After substitution of i
IRD into the appropriate first order condition for the RJV and after
similar manipulations as in the previous case, we get:
[ ] ( ) 1 +  
w
2
3q(i )  -  2q(i )  -  1  =  1 +  
w
2







The quadratic reaches its minimum at 1/3 at a value of -10/9.
Since 0 < w* < w < 1, (P2) is always positive.
This, together with the second order conditions, imply that i
IRD < i
RJV.
The proposition states that whether or not the researcher spends more time influencing
the continuation decision in the IRD compared to the RJV, depends on the correlation between
the signals of the potential partners. If the signals of potential partners are highly correlated, the
researcher in the RJV spends more time influencing the continuation decision of the RJV,
because she can only guarantee continuation if both signals are high. This requires more lobbying
effort. If the signals are not highly correlated, the researcher can assure continuation in the RJV
whenever one of the signals is high. In the IRD, the project is continued whenever the firm
observes the high signal. Note that the firm in the IRD cannot condition the continuation policy
on the signal of the potential partner. That signal is not observable, given that the other firm did
not commit to the partnership by investing the initial set up cost e. The choice of the
organizational design thus implies a choice over information structures (see footnote 7). The
information set in the IRD is coarser than in the RJV. If the correlation is low, the finer
information structure in the RJV lowers the influence activities of the researcher compared to the
IRD. If correlation is high, this result is reversed where the coarser information structure of the
IRD reduces influence activity compared to the finer information structure of the RJV. Note that
in the absence of influence activities, the firm is indifferent about the information structure.
One interesting note is that these results are independent of the actual level of the profits
in the RJV versus the IRD. This follows from the fact that Condition (1) is determined by the
expected profits of firm x when observing a high signal while firm y observes a low signal. The30
information structure for evaluating the project could hurt the firm, is interesting in its own
respect. Cremer (1995) finds a similar result, where the principal needs to decide on his
monitoring technology. In his model a better monitoring technology can hurt the principal,
because it increases the cost of commitment not to renegotiate with the agent.
Although our model is stylized, its predictions are consistent with some of the casual
observations, related to the nature of research and development, and its organization. The model
is consistent with the stylized fact that RJVs tend to be employed for projects that are more
“basic” than applied. The reason is as follows. It seems plausible that more applied projects
involve more correlated information among the partners. This is because “basic research is more
likely to lead to “unexpected” results” (Nason (1981)). A second related fact is that “the output of
basic research is never some final product to which the market place can attach a price tag.”
(Rosenberg (1990)). As a result we would expect that future expected profits of a research project
are not so closely related for more basic research projects. In terms of the model, g is close to 1 for
basic research projects. When the correlation between the signals is low and future profits are not
too competitive, the model predicts that research projects will be organized in a RJV. This is
consistent with the observation that RJVs perform research projects that are of a more basic
nature.
Example
To illustrate the model and its results we develop the following example:
The firm profits, conditional on the signal are defined as: p(t) = 1+ t. The continuation costs for
the project are F = .50. Assumption 1 is satisfied for this profit function if e = 0 and g = 1. As a
reference point note that without any influence activity, the expected profit of the firm is .75. This
is the best the firm could ever hope to do.31
The researcher's private benefit is: b(T-i) = T-i, and T = 1. To characterize the effect of
influence activity, we consider the following class of functions: q(i) = i
a. Assumption 2 is
satisfied for this class of functions, where 0 < a < .32.
Case 1: a = .1
In the IRD project the researcher invests i = .04035 in influence activity. The expected profits of
the firm from organizing the project internally are:  V
IRD(i*, d*) = .5485.
In the RJV the results depend on the correlation of the signals, w, between the partners.
The critical correlation is w* = .8154. Figure 1 illustrates how this critical correlation is found
through its dependence on F. Increasing F, decreases w*. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the amount of
influence activity by the researcher and the expected profits of firm x for both organizational
structures. For example, if correlation is w = .5, the researcher spends i = .0117 time in influence
activities and the expected profits of organizing the research project in a joint venture is V
RJV(i*,
d*) = .5838. The level of influence activity is increasing in the correlation level for w < w*.
Clearly the firm prefers the RJV to the IRD project when correlation between signals is low. If
correlation is high, the result depends on the correlation level. For example, if w = .85, the
researcher invests i = .0724 of her time in influencing the continuation decision. As a result
expected profits are  V
RJV(i*, d*) = .5345. In this case, the firm would prefer to perform the
project internally. For the correlation close to one, the firm will again prefer to organize the
project as a RJV. For example, if w = .95, the firm invests i = .07 time in influence activity. The
resulting profits of the firm are V
RJV(i*, d*) = .5575.
13  Note that influence activity is decreasing
in the correlation level for w > w*.
Case 2: a = .25
                    
     
13 It can be shown that for this example, the RJV always dominates the IRD for correlation
levels in a neighborhood of 1, except if a = 0. In that case the IRD and RJV are equivalent for w
= 1 and the RJV is strictly worse for any w < 1.32
In the IRD project the researcher invests i = .0798 in influence activity. The expected profits of
the firm from organizing the project internally are: V
IRD(i*, d*) = .57719. The results are shown
in Figures 4 through 6.
In the RJV, the results again depend on the correlation of the signals, w, between the
partners. The critical correlation is w* = .85536. For example, if correlation is w = .5, the
researcher now spends i = .0322 time in influence activities and the expected profits of
organizing the research project in a joint venture is V
RJV(i*, d*) = .628. The level of influence
activity is increasing in the correlation level for w < w*. Clearly the firm prefers the RJV to the
IRD project when correlation between signals is low. If correlation is high, the result depends on
the correlation level. For example, if w = .9, the researcher invests i = .1232 of her time in
influencing the continuation decision. As a result expected profits are V
RJV(i*, d*) = .567. In this
case the firm would prefer to perform the project internally. However, if w = .95, expected profits
are V
RJV(i*, d*) = .588, and the firm prefers to organize a RJV for high correlation levels. Again,
note that influence activity is decreasing in the correlation level for w > w*.
Conclusions and Extensions
In the model we purposefully abstracted away from any cost sharing in the RJV. Note that the
assumption that profits in the low state are zero only allows for actual cost sharing when both
firms observe the high signal. In all other cases, the firm with the low signal will refuse to
continue the project. As such, the main result of the paper remains valid under cost sharing. In
particular, the critical correlation level remains unchanged, given that one firm will have to bear
all the costs after observing the high signal while the partner observes a low signal. This result
can be generalized, given that the researcher only cares about the continuation of the project and
not which firm is in control. As long as sx p(t) + sy p(t) > F, renegotiation between the partners
will insure continuation of the project when correlation is low and there will exist a critical w*
such that expected profits are zero when one firm observes a high signal and the other a low33
signal. Cost sharing will improve the expected profitability of the RJV compared to the IRD. This
does not affect the results of Proposition 6, that the RJV is preferred to the IRD when w < w*. If
w > w*, the effects of cost sharing counterbalance the negative effect of competitive future profits
and the expected profits of the RJV increase compared to the IRD. Another effect of cost sharing
is that Proposition 1 does not hold when firms share costs after both observing a high signal, so
allowing cost sharing breaks the indifference of firms between a RJV and an IRD when there is
no influence activity by the researcher. We could think of the firms setting up a 50-50 RJV. This
might be the outcome of a bilateral bargaining game. After the signals are revealed, the
ownership shares are renegotiated whenever both firms do not observe a high signal. Extending
the model to endogenously account for cost sharing, might generate some insights into ownership
structures of research joint ventures.
Another important assumption about the firms in the model is that they operate in a
single business. As a result they are unable to create the same organizational flexibility internally
and thus an internal R&D project can not mimic the research joint venture. This begs the
question whether diversified firms could create the same environment as in the joint venture.
Indeed, suppose the firm has two divisions in different lines of business. An internal R&D project
as a joint venture across divisions could create the same incentives for researchers as a joint
venture would. The signals that the different divisions observed, would not be perfectly correlated
and create a similar flexibility as in the research joint venture. Unrelated diversified firms would
reduce the correlation within the signal structure of the firm even more than related
diversification. In that respect, the observation that central R&D labs of diversified firms perform
more basic research projects is also consistent with the model. Diversified firms would thus
realize economies of scope as a result of less influence activity and more research effort by the34
researchers without the divisions necessarily sharing the costs of a research project.
14 An
empirical prediction resulting from this argument is that we should observe more joint ventures
between non-diversified firms than between diversified firms, because diversified firms can create
a similar flexibility by engaging in internal R&D projects across divisions. The central R&D lab
of a firm that is divisionalized according to geographic markets, however, will not outperform
R&D projects organized within each division, because we expect the signals in this firm to be
highly correlated. Scott (1988) suggests that there is actually some substitution between R&D in
diversified firms and cooperative joint ventures. He claims that the introduction of the NCRA in
1984, which made the formation of cooperative ventures less costly for firms, might have resulted
in a substitution of diversified R&D for cooperative ventures. As a result welfare might not have
increased by as much as people like to claim, especially if you believe that joint ventures behave
more collusive on the market than two separate but diversified firms would.
An alternative view of the RJV presented in the paper, would be one where the
researcher needs to lobby to two decision makers in the RJV compared to only one in the IRD.
15
In this case, the researcher needs to convince the two parties in order to continue the project. The
marginal cost of influence activity increases in the RJV and as a result the researcher spends less
effort in influence activity in the RJV compared to in the IRD. In this model organizational
design impacts the cost of engaging in influence activity, while in our model we attribute private
benefits from continuing the project and as a result from influence activity.
Another possibly interesting extension of the model is to increase the number of firms
that participate in the RJV. Technically, it is not immediately obvious how to extend the signal
structure to more than two firms. The intuition, however, would be similar. Increasing the
                    
     
14 Union Miniere has the policy that a research project at the central R&D lab can have
several business units as a partner, but only one of the business units will actually fund the
project.
     
15 I would like to thank Scott Schaefer for suggesting this alternative approach.35
number of participants increases the likelihood that at least one firm gets a high signal and is
willing to continue the project. In the limit, the project is continued for sure and there is no
influence activity by the researcher. All her effort goes into research, which increases the
expected future profits of the research project. However, we would expect that increasing the
number of firms, increases the likelihood that future profits are competitive. In the notation of the
model, this means that g(n) is decreasing in the number of firms. It is reasonable to conjecture
that the marginal benefits of increasing the number of member firms through reduced influence
activity, decreases fast, while its marginal cost, the reduction in benefits, increases fast. This
would lead to an optimal number of member firms. A plausible extension of Proposition 6, would
be that the optimal number of member firms in the RJV is decreasing in the correlation between
signals (however defined). We expect only one member firm (IRD) for a high level of correlation,
while we expect many member firms for low levels of correlation. The parallel between more
basic research projects versus more applied projects is readily extended: we expect more member
firms to join a more basic research project. MCC, which is considered to engage in more basic
research has 22 member firms. However, more applied research projects, typically have only a
few member firms. An alternative mechanism that would eliminate influence activity by the
researchers, is to organize a research institute. The research institute would commit to continue
any project that has been commissioned. At some point it might be more efficient to organize a
research institute with several firms and limit the number of members and as such the
competitive effect of research joint ventures.
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Figure 1: Critical Correlation Level, a = 0.1.
Figure 2: Influence Activity by the Researcher in the IRD
and the RJV, a = 0.1.39
Figure 4: Critical Correlation Level, a = 0.25.
Figure 5: Influence Activity by the Researcher in the IRD
and RJV, a = 0.25.
Figure 6: Profits of the Firm for the RJV and the IRD,
a = 0.25404142